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Carved in granite? Variable constitutional architecture in 
Hungary (2010-2018)¨ 
by Nóra Chronowski 
Abstract: Scolpita nel granito? La struttura costituzionale variabile in Ungheria 
(2010-2018) – The Hungarian constitution called Fundamental Law of Hungary was 
adopted in April 2011 and came into force on 1 January 2012. However, at the time of its 
adaption it was promised that the new constitution is carved in granite (i.e. will be stable 
and unchangeable), in the past years it was amended seven times. Dismantling of the pre-
2010 constitutional system in less than two years and the frequent amendments to the new 
Fundamental Law raise a triggering question: does the constitution in Hungary fulfil its 
primary function of constraining public power? Or is it a simple instrument for the 
supermajority government? The study analysis the Hungarian constitution making and 
amending practice of the last decade and tries to explain why the stability of the constitution 
is not observed. 
Keywords: Hungarian constitution; Constitution-making; Constitutional amendments; 
Division of powers; Constitutional Court. 
1. Introduction 
The Hungarian constitutional developments since 2010 have attracted 
widespread attention throughout Europe. There have been various explanations 
surrounded the new constitutional identity building including criticism and 
concerns1 and welcoming and self-justification2. The new Fundamental Law of 
Hungary came into force on 1st January 2012 after a relatively rapid period of 
constitution making. However, the constitutional patchwork was not finished, 
and seven adopted amendments have shaped and shaded the new constitutional 
architecture and, of course not with equal significance, but all of them influenced 
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1 See e.g. Z. Szente, F. Mandák, Z. Fejes (eds.), Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent Hungarian 
Constitutional Development, Paris, 2015; G.A. Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation – 
on Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, Budapest and New York, 2012, A.L. Pap, Democratic 
Decline in Hungary. Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy, London and New York, 2018. 
2 See e.g. L. Csink, B. Schanda, A.Zs. Varga (eds.), The Basic Law of Hungary. A First 
Commentary, Dublin, 2012; A.Zs. Varga, A. Patyi, B, Schanda, The Basic (Fundamental) Law of 
Hungary. A Commentary of the New Hungarian Constitution, Dublin, 2015; L. Trócsányi, The 
Dilemmas of Drafting the Hungarian Fundamental Law, Passau, 2016. 
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the present landscape. A practically unlimited constitution amending power – a 
two-third parliamentary majority – acted during 2012-14, when the most 
formative amendments were adopted. We can also describe this time as a 
permanent constitution making period. After the 2014 elections, in the lack of 
two-third majority the compromise-finding amendment practice that 
characterised the pre-2010 constitutional system returned. In this period the 
governing party alliance had one successful and one failed amendment. Finally, 
after the 2018 elections the governing majority bearing again the two-third of 
the mandates in the parliament almost immediately adopted another amendment. 
There are some triggering questions beyond the numbers: Why the stability of 
the constitution has not become the part of the constitutional culture in 
Hungary? Is the power-restraining function of the constitution observed at all in 
Hungary?  
In this paper, a short section is commenced to the theoretical background 
of the division of constitution making and constitution amending power, to 
clarify why this theory cannot be applied under Hungarian circumstances. 
Attention then moves to an analysis of the constitution making and amending 
practice of the past decade (from 2010) with special regard to the reduction of 
rule of law guaranties and incapacitating the judicial review. Finally, the reasons 
of the instability of the Hungarian constitutions are sought, taking into 
consideration the long traditions of unwritten constitution as well. 
2. Constitution making and amending power in the ‛division of powers’ 
system – the theory and its limits 
The division of powers doctrine is one of the most influential principles of 
constitutional law which from time to time undergoes a new revival.3 One of its 
aspects is the differentiation and separation of the constitution making and 
constitution amending power. In contrast to the Schmittian concept of an 
unlimited constitution making power4 there are steady efforts in the academic 
discourse to distinguish the primary and secondary constitution making power 
and to identify the limits of constituent power and constitution amending 
power.5 The purpose of this study is to analyse the Hungarian constitutional 
 
3 B. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, in 113 Harvard Law Review, 3 (2000), 633-725, 
639. 
4 C. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, (transl. and ed. J. Seitzer), Durnham and London, 2008, 
125. 
5 G. Burdeau, Essai d'une théorie de la révision des lois constitutionnelles en droit français (Thèse 
pour le doctorat en droit, Faculté de droit de Paris), Paris, 1930; A. Negri, Le pouvoir 
constituent: essai sur les alternatives de la modernité, Paris, 1997; G. Bianco, Brevi note su potere 
costituente e storia, in Studi in onore di Pietro Rescigno, Milano, 1999; K. Gözler, Pouvoir 
constituant, Bursa, 1999; H.-P. Schneider, Die verfassunggebende Gewalt, in Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band VII (hrgs. J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof), 
Heidelberg 1992; E.W. Böckenförde, Die verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein 
Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, in Id., Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie – Studien zur 
Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt am Main, 1991; Y. Roznai, 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford, 2017; J. 
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turmoil, however, the basic distinctions, synthetized from the referred works, 
will be applied. 
The constitution making power as a pre-constitutional power is 
theoretically unlimited thus can create any kind of constitution e.g. after a 
revolution or a state establishment. This power can be considered as existing 
beyond the system of division of powers, although it is not a permanent actor of 
the constitutional system, because its mandate is restricted to the elaboration of 
the constitution. This is a pre-constitutional power and is not even bound by the 
former constitution of the country. However, a democratic constitution making 
is moderated by procedural elements such as legitimised, open, transparent, 
deliberative and democratic process. The drafter also shall take into 
consideration the functions of a constitution i.e., manifesting and symbolizing the 
integrity and unity of the given political community and limiting of the state 
power; political and cultural traditions of the country and the international 
obligations and expectations of the international community.6  
The constitution-amending power as a constituted power is limited7 and 
can be exercised under the framework of the constitution and according to the 
rules prescribed in the constitution. The limitations of the constitution-
amending power must be set in the constitution, e.g., formal-procedural rules 
and substantive ones. Formal-procedural limitations e.g. that two subsequent 
parliaments discuss or adopt the amendment, or qualified majority, are necessary 
to the adoption or the procedure is combined with obligatory or optional 
referendum. The special procedural rules also serve the separation of 
constitution amending and legislative powers. Substantive limitations are the 
eternity clauses that help the constitutional court in the course of constitutional 
review to set standards against unconstitutional amendments.8 
However, under some constitutional jurisdiction, the above outline theory 
is completely inapplicable. First, the constitution making and constitution 
amending power is undividable under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
where no acts of parliament can be challenged against a higher rule; 
constitutional review is not accepted and qualified majority is not applied for the 
decision making in the parliament.9 Second, the two concerned powers are 
undividable – as in Hungary10 – if the same rules govern constitution making 
and amending. Regarding the organ and the procedure, both powers are vested 
 
Petrétei, Az alkotmányos demokrácia alapintézményei, Budapest-Pécs, 2009, 67-80; L. Csink, 
Mozaikok a hatalommegosztáshoz, Budapest, 2014. 
6 H.-P. Schneider, op.cit., 20. 
7 Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, 1986, 152. 
8 N. Chronowski, T. Drinóczi, J. Zeller, Túl az alkotmányon… 3 Közjogi Szemle, 4 (2010), 1-
12, 4-6. 
9 E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law, Oxford, 1998, 88, 211. 
10 Z. Szente, Az „alkotmányellenes alkotmánymódosítás” és az alkotmánymódosítások bírósági 
felülvizsgálatának dogmatikai problémái a magyar alkotmányjogban, in Alkotmányozás és 
alkotmányjogi változások Európában és Magyarországon (szerk. F. Gárdos-Orosz, Z. Szente), 
Budapest, 2014, 218. 
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in the parliament, and no substantive guarantees are established for the stability 
of the constitution e.g., eternity clause.  
In Hungary, Article S of the Fundamental Law declares the rules of 
constitution making and amending. Paragraph (1) stipulates the initiation – in 
the same way as in the case of legislative initiatives – “A proposal for the 
adoption of a new Fundamental Law or for the amendment of the Fundamental 
Law may be submitted by the President of the Republic, the Government, any 
parliamentary committee or any Member of the National Assembly.” Paragraph 
(2) sets down the adoption, which does not differ from the majority required by 
the former Hungarian Constitution (Act XX of 1949) – “For the adoption of a 
new Fundamental Law or the amendment of the Fundamental Law, the votes of 
two-thirds of the Members of the National Assembly shall be required.” These 
regulations – together with Article 1 paragraph (2) point a) – express that the 
adoption and the amendment of the constitution is the exclusive competence of 
the National Assembly, the supreme organ of popular representation. The same 
rules governed constitution-making and amending in the former Constitution 
(Act XX of 1949), but the Fundamental Law contains some novelties. 
Article 8 on national referendum in its paragraph (3) point a) stipulates 
that national referenda may not be held on any “questions aimed at amending the 
Fundamental Law” and thus the electorate is not involved into constitutional 
matters. The people of Hungary may exercise its constitution making power 
stemming from popular sovereignty only indirectly through the parliament.11 
The former Constitution did not exclude explicitly the referendum on 
constitutional issues. 
Paragraph (3) of Article S was revised by the Fourth Amendment of the 
Fundamental Law in 2013, which clarifies that, in the course of constitution 
making and constitution amending, the head of state cannot exercise political 
veto i.e., the president cannot send back the constitution or amendments to the 
parliament for consideration and the constitutional veto is limited to the 
initiation of the constitutional review of procedural requirements, i.e. validity.12 
Thus, the substantive constitutional review of the constitution or its amendment 
is excluded – “The Speaker of the National Assembly shall sign the adopted 
Fundamental Law or the adopted amendment of the Fundamental Law within 
five days and shall send it to the President of the Republic. The President of the 
Republic shall sign the Fundamental Law, as received, or the amendment 
thereof, as received, within five days of receipt and shall order its publication in 
the official journal. If the President of the Republic finds that any procedural 
requirement laid down in the Fundamental Law with respect to adoption of the 
Fundamental Law or the amendment of the Fundamental Law has not been met, 
the President shall request the Constitutional Court to examine the issue. Should 
the examination by the Constitutional Court not establish the violation of such 
 
11 J. Petrétei, Magyarország alkotmányjoga I. Alapvetés, alkotmányos intézmények, Pécs, 2013. 
132. 
12 Ibid. 
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requirements, the President of the Republic shall immediately sign the 
Fundamental Law or the amendment of the Fundamental Law and shall order its 
promulgation in the official journal.” The formal constitutional review, regarding 
the procedural requirements of the adoption, of the Fundamental Law or its 
amendment may take place subsequently, according to Article 24 paragraph (5) 
point b), upon the request of the Government; one-fourth of the Members of the 
National Assembly; the President of the Kúria [Supreme Court of Hungary] and 
the Prosecutor General or the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. This can 
only happen within thirty days of promulgation.  
Paragraph (4) of Article S provides for the special denotation of 
constitutional amendments, which is different from that of legislative acts of 
parliament as the Fundamental Law. These amendments do not belong to the 
legal acts enumerated in Article T, they are instead special, independent and 
original13 sources of law – “The designation of the amendment of the 
Fundamental Law in its promulgation shall include the title, the serial number of 
the amendment and the day of promulgation.” 
3. 2010/11 constitution making in Hungary 
In Hungary a new constitution, the Fundamental Law was promulgated on 25 
April 2011 and came into force on 1 January 2012. Its drafting rose to 
prominence in Europe and was severely criticized both by domestic experts and 
the Venice Commission. After the 2010 parliamentary elections, political forces 
forming a parliamentary majority, possessing two-thirds of the seats, expressed 
their intention to create a new constitution. In the course of “replacing the old 
with new”, the development of another constitutional regime and the writing of 
the Fundamental Law came in parallel with the devastation of the previous 
constitutional order with permanent amendments to the former Constitution. In 
the background of this policy, the unequal fight of the Constitutional Court and 
the governing majority took place which could be summarised by the question 
‘who is the final arbiter in constitutional matters?’.14 This ended in the partial 
incapacitation of the Constitutional Court by weakening it as a counterbalance of 
the executive and legislative powers.15 Until the Fourth Amendment, the 
Constitutional Court made cautious efforts to strike down the strivings of the 
supermajority government acting in the parliament.16 Since then and especially 
after the failed Seventh Amendment in 2016, as the institutional and competence 
changes had their effect, the Constitutional Court gave a helping hand to the 
 
13 J. Petrétei, Magyarország alkotmányjoga, cit., 131. 
14 N. Chronowski, M. Varju, Two Eras of Hungarian Constitutionalism: From the Rule of Law to 
Rule by Law, in 8 Hague J Rule Law, 2 (2016), 271-289, 281-282. 
15 See also Z. Szente, The Decline of Constitutional Review in Hungary – Towards a Partisan 
Constitutional Court?, in Z. Szente, F. Mandák, Z. Fejes (eds.) Challenges and Pitfalls in the 
Recent Hungarian Constitutional Development, Paris, 2015, 192-196. 
16 See to this N. Chronowski, The Fundamental Law Within the Network of Multilevel European 
Constitutionalism, in Z. Szente, F. Mandák, Z. Fejes (eds.) Challenges and Pitfalls, cit., 223-240. 
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constitution maker and it is even ready to substitute the constituent will to go 
along with the intents of the government.17 
The antecedent circumstances of the Hungarian constitution making 
meant that the political situation was overloaded with the effects of the economic 
world crisis and domestic tensions –thus after a constitutional but unsuccessful 
governance, society was deeply divided at the time of 2010 election, i.e., the 
majority of citizens wanted a change of government. The newly elected two-
third majority government blamed the past for all the difficulties and the former 
Constitution became one of the scapegoats and was no longer no worthy of any 
respect. 
Permanent amendments to the old Constitution commenced in parallel 
with the declaration of creating a brand new constitution. These amendments 
can be grouped into two types: ‘normal’ modifications and ‘demolishing’ 
amendments. The ‘normal’ modifications are justified because any new 
government is authorised to constitutional reforms on the basis of its electoral 
program and experiences of the constitutional practise. However, only a 
minority of the 2010-11 amendments belonged to this group: 
1) The number of seats in the parliament were reduced to 200 from 
386.18 
2) The position of deputy prime minister was introduced.19 
3) The status of deputy major, other organs of local governments and 
the transfer of state administration competencies were modified.20  
4) There were clarifications on the legal system, legal acts, rules of ex 
ante norm control were set down21 
5) The status of the prosecutor general was reformed to increase its 
independence.22 
6) The Supervisory Authority of Financial Organisations23 and 
National Media Authority became constitutional organs.24 
The subject matters of the ‘demolishing’ amendments were: 
 
17 See below the story of the originally failed Seventh Amendment, and the role of the 
Constitutional Court; N. Chronowski, A. Vincze, Önazonosság és európai integráció – az 
Alkotmánybíróság az identitáskeresés útján, in 72 Jogtudományi Közlöny, 3 (2017), 117-132. 
18 Act of 25 May 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(not exactly this solution was maintained in the Fundamental Law). 
19 Act of 25 May 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. 
20 Act/1 of 6 July 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. 
21 Act CXIII of 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 16 November 2010). 
22 Act CXIII of 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 16 November 2010). 
23 Act CXIII of 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 16 November 2010, it was not maintained in the Fundamental Law). 
24 Act CLXIII of 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (it 
was not maintained in the Fundamental Law). 
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1) The nomination of Constitutional Court judges – the composition of 
the nominating parliamentary committee changed and the opposition 
lost its influence on nomination.25 
2) The freedom of press – a constitutional basis for new media 
legislation was created.26  
3) Judiciary – court clerks were allowed to act as judge in certain 
cases.27  
4) A special tax was introduced on severance pay against bona fides 
(morals) in public service.28 
5) Limitations on the right to be elected for officials of the armed 
forces.29 
6) Applying a limitation on the Constitutional Court’s competence 
regarding the review of acts concerning public finances.30 
7) A special tax on severance pay – retroactive legislation backdated up 
to five years.31 
8) A basis for changing pension system in order to remove early 
retirement benefits.32 
9) The nationalisation of local governments’ property.33 
10) Judiciary – the president of the Kúria (Supreme Court) shall be 
elected until 31. December 2011.34 
 
25 Act of 5 July 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, 
authorised the governing majority in the parliament to appoint the judges unilaterally, 
without the consent of the opposition. 
26 Act/2 of 6 July 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. 
27 Act/2 of 11 August 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary. 
28 Act/2 of 11 August 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary. 
29 Act/1 of 11 August 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary (it was not maintained in the Fundamental Law). 
30 Act CXIX of 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 19 November 2010, it was announced as a temporary limitation, but the 
Fundamental Law has maintained). 
31 Act CXIX of 2010 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 19 November 2010). 
32 Act LXI of 2011 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 14 June 2011). 
33 Act CXLVI of 2011 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 14 November 2011). 
34 Act CLIX of 2011 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 1 December 2011; with the intention to remove the acting president, András 
Baka; later the European Court of Human Rights stated the violation of the Convention, see 
Baka v. Hungary, Judgement of 27 May 2014, no. 20261/12.) 
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11) The president of the Constitutional Court shall be elected by the 
parliament instead of the court and the number of elected was 
increased to 15 from 11 judges.35  
There is a clear line of threatening (constitutional) judiciary and 
undermining the rule of law in this group of amendments whilst the 
supermajority also strived to eliminate the constitutional impediments of 
economic governance and policy-making as well.36 
In the meantime, following the announcement of constitution making 
intentions, a parliamentary ad hoc committee was set up in June 2010 with the 
responsible for preparing the constitution and its work started in September 
2010. The composition of the committee reflected the parliamentary proportions 
of the party fractions. In 2010, the preparatory activity was not intensive. 
During July and August, some expert teams from universities and research 
institutes, as well as representative organizations of the civil society were invited 
to share with the committee their recommendations to the constitution making. 
At this stage the expert and interest groups received no feedbacks from the 
parliamentary ad hoc committee and their substantive participation was not 
realised. 
For a variety of reasons, the opposition left the preparatory committee and 
in December 2010 the concept of the new constitution was only endorsed by the 
representatives of the ruling coalition in the ad hoc committee. Finally, no draft 
was elaborated on the basis of this concept instead, the concept was put aside and 
all the parliamentary fractions were given the chance to submit their own draft 
constitutions.  
In early March 2011, two bills on the new constitution were lodged in the 
parliament: one by the governing party alliance (bill on the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary) and the other by an independent MP (bill on the Constitution of the 
Republic of Hungary). They were parallel discussed from 21 March and after 9 
effective days of parliamentary debate on 18 April 2011 the bill of the governing 
parties was endorsed with the two-third majority of votes of the MPs with no 
opposition MPs voting for the bill.37 The new constitution, the Fundamental 
Law was adopted with a reference to the effective Constitution: “This 
Fundamental Law shall be adopted by the National Assembly pursuant to 
Sections 19 (3) a) and 24 (3) of Act XX of 1949.” Thus the validity of the 
Fundamental Law derives from the former Constitution. 
This short summary clearly shows that the actual and effective 
constitution-making was quick but not at all transparent. The general public had 
only five weeks to evaluate the text and the scope of the actors with effective 
influence on the formulation of the draft remained secret. Academic institutions, 
 
35 Act LXI of 2011 on the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary 
(published on 14 June 2011). 
36 M. Varju, N. Chronowski, Constitutional backsliding in Hungary, in 6 Tijdschrift voor 
Constitutioneel Recht, 4 (2015), 296-310, 298. 
37 N. Chronowski, Human Rights in a Multilevel Constitutional Area. Global, European and 
Hungarian Challenges, Paris, 2018, 105-111. 
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expert organizations, civilians, minorities and other groups of the society had no 
role in the process and the preparatory committee in the parliament was also just 
the part of the scenery. 
Assuming and accepting that the constitution making power is an original 
political will and the process itself cannot be criticized. However, if the final goal 
is the creation of a democratic constitution, integration with society and meeting 
with the expectations of the international community, with special regards to 
those international and supranational organisations (Council of Europe and 
European Union) in which Hungary is a member state, is key. It is no wonder 
that the parallel constructive and destructive methods raised severe domestic 
and international criticism. The Venice Commission issued two opinions during 
the Hungarian constitution making, first upon the request of the Hungarian 
government38 (March 2011),39 and second upon the request of the Monitoring 
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly CE (June 2011). 
It must be noted that the draft of the new constitution was not sent to the 
Venice Commission on time and thus the first opinion of 28 March 2011 
contained general comments and not evaluated any particular provisions of the 
draft constitutional text. 
The Venice Commission in its second opinion, published on 20 June 2011, 
examined the final text and revealed several criticalities that should be 
eliminated by utilising the common European values during the interpretation.40 
The commission welcomed the most recent European constitution but it also 
formulated important concerns and critics regarding: 
1) The procedure of drafting, deliberating and adopting without the 
opposition and the wider public. 
 
38 The Venice Commission was addressed three legal questions by the Deputy Prime-
Minister and Minister of Public Administration and Justice of Hungary: i) To what extent 
may the incorporation in the new Constitution of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights enhance the protection of fundamental rights in Hungary and thereby also contribute 
to strengthening the common European protection of these rights?;ii) What is the role and 
significance of the preliminary (ex ante) review among the competences of the Constitutional 
Court. In particular, who is entitled to submit a request for preliminary review? What is the 
effect of a decision passed by the Constitutional Court in a preliminary review procedure on 
the legislative competence of the Parliament? iii) What is the role and significance of the 
actio popularis in ex post constitutional review? What is the state of play in Europe as 
regards the availability of actio popularis in matters of constitutionality? Could it be 
considered as an infringement of the European constitutional heritage (acquis) if the main 
focus of the Constitutional Court’s activity was to shift from the posterior review, carried 
out on the basis of an actio popularis, to the examination of specific constitutional complaints? 
See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion no. 
614/2011, Strasbourg, 28 March 2011, Opinion on Three Legal Questions Arising in the 
Process of Drafting the New Constitution of Hungary. 
39 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 614/2011, 28 March 2011, Available at 
www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)001-e.  
40 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 621/2011, Strasbourg, 20 June 2011, Opinion on the 
New Constitution of Hungary, www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-
AD%282011%29016-E.aspx.  
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2) The high number of cardinal (organic) laws, especially in the fields of 
family legislation, social and taxation policy, which are typically 
simple majority decisions of any government. 
3) The concept of ‘historical constitution’ as rule of interpretation. 
4) The wording of the preamble. 
5) The provisions related to Hungarians living beyond the borders. 
6) The constitutional obligations with uncertain content.  
7) The lack of explicit reference to abolition of death penalty.  
8) The limitation of the Constitutional Court’s competence. 
However, the Hungarian parliament ignored the critics and insisted on the 
challenged solutions. Parliament has modified the Fundamental Law seven 
times, not considering the transitional provisions of unique status and history, 
since its entry into force and has, inter alia, cemented the model of limited 
constitutional judicature; attempted to break constitutional continuity; restricted 
the exercise of the right to vote and freedom of expression and perpetuated the 
practice of overruling the decisions of the Constitutional Court.41 
4. Amendments to the Fundamental Law 
4.1. Transitional Provisions and First Amendment 
In order to support the entry into force of the new constitution, the so-called 
Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law were adopted by the National 
Assembly.42 These was proclaimed on 31 December 2011 and came into force on 
the next day, together with the Fundamental Law. 
It was an extremely alarming issue concerning the basic principles of the 
Fundamental Law – with special regard to the principle of the rule of law – that 
the Transitional Provisions, where many of which were not of transitional 
character, have constructed an unusual constitutional liability for the 
“communist past”. Furthermore it has overruled some important statements of 
the constitutional Court e.g., on the right to the lawful and impartial judge,43 and 
undermined some rules of the Fundamental Law itself.44 
 
41 See also P. Sonnevend, A. Jakab, L. Csink, The Constitution as an Instrument of Everyday 
Party Politics: The Basic Law of Hungary, in Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional 
Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (eds. A. von Bogdandy, P. 
Sonnevend), Oxford – Portland, 2015, 52-63. 
42 The bill was lodged to the parliament by two MP’s – the fraction leaders – of the 
governing party alliance on 20 November 2011. 
43 CC Decision no. 166/2011 (XII. 20.) AB. 
44 On the TP-FL and other cardinal acts read more in Gábor Halmai and Kim Lane 
Scheppele (eds.), Amicus Brief for the Venice Commission on the Transitional Provisions of the 
Fundamental Law and the Key Cardinal Laws, February 2012, available at 
<http://fundamentum.hu/sites/default/files/amicus_brief_on_the_fourth_amendment.pdf> 
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According to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary, the 
Transitional Provisions severely harm the principle of the rule of law, which may 
cause problems of interpretation and may endanger the unity and operation of 
the legal system. The Ombudsman was concerned because the Transitional 
Provisions contained many rules which obviously a transitional character did not 
have.45 Thus, the Ombudsman requested the Constitutional Court to examine 
whether the Transitional Provisions comply with the requirements of the rule of 
law laid down in the Fundamental Law. After the Ombudsman’s initiative, the 
parliament adopted the First Amendment to the Fundamental Law clarifying 
that the Transitional Provisions are part of the constitution. By this amendment, 
the governing majority intended to avoid the constitutional review of the 
Transitional Provisions, confirming their constitutional rank.46  
It is worth to mention that in the First Amendment, the Hungarian 
parliament i.e., the two-third governing majority, gave up its intention to change 
the constitutional status of the Central Bank by merging it with the authority 
supervising financial bodies. Thus it repealed Article 30 of the Transitional 
Provisions, which originally stated: ‘A cardinal act (…) may specify that a new 
organisation assume the tasks and jurisdiction of the organisation charged with 
Financial Supervisory Authority and the Hungarian National Bank.’ The 
rationale of this amendment can be rooted in the pressure from EU institutions, 
especially from ECB, however, as it will be seen, the success was transitory. 
Despite the efforts of the governing majority, the Constitutional Court on 
the basis of the Ombudsman’s petition declared that all the articles of the 
Transitional Provisions lacking transitory character are invalid.47  
 
45 On the petition of the Ombudsman lodged in March, 2012 to the Constitutional Court 
concerning the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law see AJB 2302/2012 on 13 
March 2012, in Report on the Activities of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary 
in the Year 2012, Budapest, 2013, 49-50.  
46 In April 2012 the Government of Hungary lodged a bill to the parliament as the First 
Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary to clarify that the Transitional Provisions 
are the part of the Fundamental Law. It is available in Hungarian at 
www.parlament.hu/irom39/06817/06817.pdf. (30 April 2012) The First Amendment was 
adopted in June 2012. It added a new 5th point to the Closing Provisions of the Fundamental 
Law: “5. The transitional provisions related to this Fundamental Law adopted according to 
point 3 (31 December 2011) are part of the Fundamental Law.” Other relevant points of the 
Closing Provisions: “2. Parliament shall adopt this Fundamental Law according to point a) 
of subsection (3) of Section 19 and subsection (3) of Section 24 of Act XX of 1949. 3. The 
transitional provisions related to this Fundamental Act shall be adopted separately by 
Parliament according to the procedure referred to in point 2 above.” (The Fundamental Law 
was not in force yet when the parliament adopted the Transitional Provisions – that is the 
reason of the reference to the former Constitution). 
47 The Constitutional Court annulled approximately half of the articles of the Transitional 
Provisions in its decision of 28 December 2012 (CC Decision no. 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB). 
Press release (23 January 2013): “The Constitutional Court has declared that the Hungarian 
Parliament exceeded its legislative authority, when enacted such regulations into the 
“Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law” that did not have transitional character. 
The Hungarian Parliament shall comply with the procedural requirements also when acting 
as constitution-maker, because the regulations that violate these requirements are invalid. 
Therefore the constitutional Court annulled the concerned regulations due to formal 
deficiencies. The Constitutional Court, regarding its consistent practice, did not examine the 
constitutionality of the content of the Fundamental Law and the Transitional Provisions”, 
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In its landmark decision on the unconstitutionality of Transitional 
Provisions, the Court emphasised that the constitutional criteria of a democratic 
state governed by the rule of law are respected by the international community. 
They are reaffirmed by international treaties as values, principles and 
fundamental freedoms and some of them are part of the international ius cogens. 
These criteria must not be eroded or endangered. The Constitutional Court may 
keep under control whether the substantive guaranties and requirements of the 
democracy and rule of law prevail and how they are incorporated into the 
constitution. The Court criticized and condemned the constitutional practice of 
the parliament that infringed the principle of rule of law by enacting the 
Transitional Provisions with its controversial and non-transitional rules. The 
Court underpinned that it is a slippery-slope to deprive the Court itself from its 
jurisdiction and to establish controversial provisions with constitutional rank 
outside the text of the Fundamental Law.48 
It is worth mentioning that the governing party immediately declared that 
the annulled provisions will be inserted into the Fundamental Law, which was 
realised by the Fourth Amendment some months later. 
4.2. Intermediate amendments in 2012 
A strongly debated issue connected to the right to vote was the introduction of 
the periodical electoral registration. In the previous few decades, the electoral 
registers were created by the authorities on the basis of the personal data and 
residence registers; all adult citizens with voting right and residence in Hungary 
were automatically enrolled. Article 2 of the Fundamental Law declares 
universal and equal suffrage but the amendment to the Transitional Provisions, 
declared under the First Amendment the part of the Fundamental Law, thus 
becoming the Second Amendment, and the new act on electoral procedure 
adopted in November 2012 prescribed the registration upon request as 
precondition of voting on any kind of elections.49 The constitutionality of the 
new act on electoral procedure was examined in January 2013 by the 
Constitutional Court upon the request of the Head of State. The Court declared 
that certain provisions of the new act – on electoral registration and political 
campaign – are contrary to the Fundamental Law.50 This Constitutional Court 
 
available at hunconcourt.hu/announcement/certain-parts-of-the-transitional-provisions-of-
the-fundametal-law-held-contrary-to-the-fundamental-law/.  
48 CC Decision no. 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB, points IV.7-8. 
49 The related articles of the Transitional Provisions were annulled by the Constitutional 
Court in Decision no. 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB.  
50 CC Decision no. 1/2013. (I. 7.) AB. Press release: “The constitutional Court has declared 
that in the Act additional conditions are defined: in order to practice the right to vote, a 
previous registration should be done. Regarding these provisions, the constitutional Court 
has examined whether there is any constitutional reason for the previous registration. 
Taking the practice of the European Court of Human Rights into consideration, the 
constitutional Court has declared that in case of citizens domiciled in Hungary, the 
mandatory registration disproportionately restricted the right to vote without any reason, 
thus this is contrary to the Fundamental Law. (…) In connection with the rules of election 
campaign, the constitutional Court has declared that the freedom of expression and the 
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decision was partly successful because the governing majority gave up the idea of 
the introduction of voters’ registration, but the bans on media campaign51 were 
inserted into the Fundamental Law with the Fourth Amendment, partly 
overriding the Constitutional Court’s decision.  
The Third Amendment, adopted in relation with the preparation of new 
legislation on arable land, drew much less attention.52 It completed Article P of 
the Fundamental Law on natural resources with a new section declaring that 
“The limits and conditions for acquisition of ownership and for use of arable land 
and forests (…), as well as the rules concerning the organisation of integrated 
agricultural production and concerning family farms and other agricultural 
holdings shall be laid down in a cardinal act”.  
4.3. Fourth Amendment in 2013 
The governing majority adopted the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental 
Law as a response to the Decision no. 45/2012 of the Constitutional Court. This 
amendment incorporated into the Constitution the majority of the abolished 
articles of the Transitional Provisions and overrode several former 
Constitutional Court decisions.53 There are many valuable commentaries about 
this amendment.54 For the purpose of this study however it is worthwhile to 
 
freedom of press are disproportionally limited, because according to the Act during the 
electoral campaign the publication of political advertisements is allowed only in the public 
media service, thus these rules are contrary to the Fundamental Law. The rules that ban the 
publication of public opinion polls regarding the elections within six days before the 
elections has also been found contrary to the Fundamental Law.” Available at 
hunconcourt.hu/announcement/certain-provisions-of-the-act-on-election-procedure-held-
contrary-to-the-fundamental-law/ (12 January 2013). 
51 According to the Fourth Amendment, Art. IX(3) of the Fundamental Law shall be 
replaced by the following provision: “For the dissemination of appropriate information 
required for the formation of democratic public opinion and to ensure the equality of 
opportunity, political advertisements shall be published in media services, exclusively free of 
charge”. In the campaign period prior to the election of members of Parliament and of 
Members of the European Parliament, political advertisements published by and in the 
interest of nominating organisations setting up country-wide candidacy lists for the general 
election of members of Parliament or candidacy lists for the election of Members of the 
European Parliament shall exclusively be published by way of public media services and 
under equal conditions, as determined by cardinal Act. 
52 Published 21 December 2012. See Sonnevend, A. Jakab, L. Csink, The Constitution as an 
Instrument of Everyday Party Politics, cit., 54. 
53 On 8 February 2013, members of the governing coalition, having two-thirds of the seats 
in the Hungarian Parliament, submitted a proposal to amend the constitution. The 
parliament adopted the amendment on 11 March 2013. It was published in the official 
journal on 1 April 2013. In March 2013, in the course of the amendment, the Council of 
Europe, the UN High Commissioner, the President of the European Commission, Hungarian 
human rights associations and scholars voiced concerns over the changes. 
The amendment was firmly criticised by the Venice Commission, see Opinion no. 720/2013 
of the Venice Commission on the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, 
Strasbourg 17 June 2013, www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD%282013%29012-e (17 June 2013). 
54 See for example I. Vörös, The constitutional landscape after the fourth and fifth amendments of 
Hungarian Fundamental Law, in 55 Acta Juridica Hungarica, 1 (2014), 1-20; J. Zeller, Nichts ist 
so beständig… Die jüngsten Novellen des Grundgesetzes Ungarns im Kontext der Entscheidungen 
des Verfassungsgerichts, in 59 Osteuropa-Recht, 3 (2013), 307–325, A. Vincze, Wrestling with 
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emphasize that the provisions inserted into the Fundamental Law can be once 
more grouped into two types: modifications with overriding character and the 
amendments imposing further limitations on constitutional review. The first 
group contains:  
1) The President of National Judicial Office received power to transfer 
proceedings.55 
2) The introduction of New restrictions on free expression and ban on 
certain political advertisements.56  
3) The constitutional ground for criminalization of homelessness.57  
4) Parliament’s final say on church status.58  
5) The constitutional notion of family was narrowed to married couples, 
parents with child59  
6) Domestic employment in exchange for state contribution to study 
costs regarding the students contracts.60 
The other group of amendments was devoted to reinforce the control over 
constitutional review: 
1) In order to settle the superior constitutional authority of government 
acting in parliament and to take the edge out of potential future 
attempts by the Court to oppose government action in the spirit of 
pre-2010 constitutionalism, the Fourth Amendment repealed every 
decision of the Constitutional Court which had been delivered prior 
to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law.61 
2) Despite the Constitutional Court never performing a substantive 
review of constitutional amendments, Article S paragraph (3) was 
reformulated in order to prevent any potential future efforts of this 
kind. The Fundamental Law now set down the formal ex ante and a 
‘within 30 days from promulgation’ ex post review of amendments as 
exclusive options. 
3) Article 37(4) in the Chapter on Public Finances of the Fundamental 
Law lays down, with regard to ex post norm control and 
constitutional complaint procedures, that the Constitutional Court is 
 
Constitutionalism: the supermajority and the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in 7 Vienna Journal 
on International Constitutional Law, 4 (2013), 86–97.  
55 CC Decision no. 166/2011. (XII. 20.) AB declared it unconstitutional. 
56 CC Decision no. 1/2013. (I. 7.) AB held it contrary to the Fundamental Law.  
57 CC Decision no. 38/2012. (XI. 14.) AB held it contrary to the Fundamental Law. 
58 CC Decision no. 6/2013. (III. 1.) AB held it contrary to the Fundamental Law. 
59 CC Decision no. 43/2012. (XII. 20.) AB held it contrary to the Fundamental Law. 
60 CC Decision No. 32/2012. (VII. 4.) AB held it contrary to the Fundamental Law. 
61 Before the Fourth Amendment, the Court followed the practice of revisiting its previous 
jurisprudence adopted under the 1989 Constitution in case the text of the constitutional 
provisions was the same in the two documents, see CC Decision no. 22/2012 (V. 11.) AB.  
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prevented from reviewing the content of an act or annulling acts on 
public finances, with the exception of four “protected fundamental 
rights”, as long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic 
Product.62 This is not even rectified by the fact that Acts relating to 
this subject-matter may be annulled in the case that the requirements 
of the legislative process were not met (for formal reasons). The 
Transitional Provisions upheld and extended the effect of the 
disputed limitation on constitutional review63 and the Fourth 
Amendment incorporated it into the constitution.64 
4) The Transitional Provisions originally introduced further indirect 
constraints on the right to effective judicial protection. The Fourth 
Amendment maintained this line. If the ruling of Constitutional 
Court or the CJEU results a debt obligation of the State, under 
certain circumstances a general contribution covering the common 
needs i.e., extra tax, shall be adopted. It can be understood as an 
intention to sanction, at least indirectly, the lawsuits and complaints 
in cases of great economic significance.65 The European Commission 
had expressed its serious concerns about the conformity with EU law 
of the new article on CJEU judgements entailing payment 
obligations and the Fifth Amendment subsequently repealed this 
rule. 
The Venice Commission was also concerned about the systematic shielding 
ordinary law from the constitutional review. The reduction (budgetary matters) 
and in some cases complete removal (constitutionalised matters) of the 
competence of the Court to review ordinary legislation undermines the principle 
of rule of law, as the constitutional protection of the standards of the 
 
62 “As long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, the constitutional 
Court may, within its competence set out in Article 24(2)b-e), only review the Acts on the 
State Budget and its implementation, the central tax type, duties, pension and healthcare 
contributions, customs and the central conditions for local taxes for conformity with the 
Fundamental Law or annul the preceding Acts due to violation of the right to life and 
human dignity, the right to the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, and with the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. The constitutional Court 
shall have the unrestricted right to annul the related Acts for non-compliance with the 
Fundamental Law’s procedural requirements for the drafting and publication of such 
legislation”. Article 37(4) of the Fundamental Law 
63 Art. 27 of the Transitional Provisions: “Article 37(4) of the Fundamental Law shall remain 
in force for Acts that were promulgated when the state debt to the Gross Domestic Product 
ratio exceeded 50% even if the ration no longer exceeds 50%”.  
64 Art. 17 of the Fourth Amendment. 
65 See Art. 29 of the Transitional Provisions: “As long as the public debt exceeds 50% of the 
GDP, if the constitutional Court, the CJEU, other Court or other law applying that body’s 
decision requires the State to pay a fine, and the Act on the central budget does not contain 
necessary reserves to pay the fine, and the amount of the fine cannot be allocated from the 
budget without undermining a balanced management of the budget or no other item from 
the budget may be eliminated to provide for the fine, a general contribution covering the 
common needs must be specified that relates in its name and content exclusively and 
explicitly to the above fine”. This Article was annulled by the Constitutional Court in its 
Decision no. 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB. 
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Fundamental Law becomes limited and also undermines the democratic system 
of checks and balances, as the Constitutional Court lost its influence and is not 
able to provide effective control.66 
4.4. The Fifth Amendment in 2013 
The Fifth Amendment was adopted by the governing majority in 
September 2013 with the intention of ‘closing international debates.’ However 
not all of the challenged articles were modified and the amendment entered into 
force on 1 October 2013. The amendment: 
 1) Voided the option of extra tax for certain court decisions and the 
power of the President of the NJO to transfer proceedings. 
2) Modified the ban on certain political advertisements and since then the 
constitution allows publishing political ads in all types of media, not just on 
public service broadcasts, but exclusively free of charge and with equal air time, 
or alternatively not at all. It is rather hypocritical solution, because if the 
commercial media is prohibited to charge for political advertisements and has to 
guarantee equal airtime for all qualified parties during the campaign, the more 
economic choice may be to refrain from this activity.  
3) Smoothly amended, with the rules of cooperation, the authorisation of 
the Parliament to decide on recognising of established churches. Under the 
modified regulation, all religious communities (churches) may operate freely, but 
those of them seeking further cooperation with the State must be permitted by 
the parliament, thus receiving “established” or “accepted” church status. This 
solution still erodes secularism and leaves room for political considerations in 
the recognition of churches. 
4) Ironically – and contrary to the First Amendment – it reintroduced the 
constitutional basis for merging the authority supervising financial bodies and 
the Hungarian National Bank. 
4.5. Further amendments and attempts in 2016 
The loss of a by-election in 2015 resulted in the governing party alliance no 
longer having a two-third majority in the National Assembly and heralded a 
return to the compromise-finding constitution-amending techniques of pre-2010. 
The draft bill of the Sixth Amendment, in order to set down new, relaxed rules 
on introducing special legal order in case of a terror threat, originally was not 
officially published at the parliament website but was later by a far-right 
opposition MP.67 It was business as usual with no public debate or democratic 
deliberation regarding the subject matter68 but the lack of constituent majority 
 
66 Opinion no. 720/2013 of the Venice Commission, point 87. 
67 The bill was finally tabled by the government on 26 April 2016. 
68 Civil unions criticized the amendment for undermining the rule of law: 
www.amnesty.nl/actueel/hungary-proposed-sixth-amendment-to-the-constitution-would-
be-a-frontal-attack-on-human-rights; www.ekint.org/en/constitutionality/2016-04-
08/ekints-standpoint-on-the-public-deliberation-of-the-sixth-amendment-of-the-
fundamental-law.  
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forced the government to cross-check and negotiate with the opposition. The 
Sixth Amendment entered into force on 1 July 2016 and introduced a new state 
of emergency in case of threat or act of terrorism, beyond the existing five 
special legal order situations: National crisis, emergency, preventive defence, 
unforeseen intrusion and danger.69 There is no room for a thorough analysis, but 
a short comment seems to be necessary. This regulation still provides wide 
discretional power to the government, because the constitution allows the 
introduction of the special legal order even in case of terror threat – about which 
the intelligence agency may have exact information, thus the democratic control 
on the necessity of the introduction is rather limited. The question arises 
whether it is a proportional answer to the refugee crises that motivated the 
amendment. 
A failed attempt to amend the Fundamental Law occurred in October 2016 
with the government intending to set new substantive limits on joint exercise of 
power with other member states in the framework of the European Union in 
order to protect the Hungarian constitutional identity and prohibit the 
resettlement of foreign population in the territory of Hungary. There was an 
invalid referendum (2 October 2016) on EU refugee relocation quota in the 
background of the issue.70 The government’s plans with the referendum and the 
subsequently failed amendment fizzled out but the Constitutional Court gave a 
helping hand. 
In its Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB, the Court established that upon a 
relevant motion and in the course of exercising its competences it may review 
whether the joint exercise of powers with other EU member states or by way of 
the EU institutions violates human dignity, or another fundamental right, the 
sovereignty of Hungary or its constitutional identity based on the country’s 
historical constitution. The judgment raised countless questions71 stemming 
from the political influences, such as the invalid refugee relocation referendum 
and the failed attempt of constitutional amendment and the controversial former 
case law of the Court. It remains unclear whether the newly invented national 
constitutional identity, which naturally originates in the ancient Hungarian 
historic constitution, is a shield or a sword. In other words, it is still an open 
question how the new judge-made competence will be used in the conflicts of EU 
law and domestic constitutional law. However, what the Constitutional Court 
 
69 R. Uitz, Hungary’s attempt to manage threats of terror through a constitutional amendment, in 
Constitutionnet, 28 April 2016, available at www.constitutionnet.org/news/hungarys-
attempt-manage-threats-terror-through-constitutional-amendment. 
70 Z. Szente, The Controversial Anti-Migrant Referendum in Hungary is Invalid, in Constitutional 
Change, 11 October 2016, available at constitutional-change.com/the-controversial-anti-
migrant-referendum-in-hungary-is-invalid. 
71 For a thorough analysis, see G. Halmai, The Misuse of Human Dignity and Constitutional 
Identity – The Case of Hungary, manuscript (2018), 7-14., available at me.eui.eu/gabor-
halmai/wp-content/uploads/sites/385/2018/11/Dignity_identity_Hungary_Halmai.pdf. 
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was seeking in vain during the domestic constitutional turmoil, now seemingly 
has found against the power of the EU by a dangerous legal transplant.72 
4.6. Seventh Amendment in 2018 
The Seventh Amendment was finally adopted on 20 June 2018, whereas – after 
the general parliamentary elections – the two-third majority of the governing 
party alliance was regained. The former draft amendment was reinforced and 
complemented with new issues: establishment of an Administrative High Court 
and creating constitutional basis for a judiciary reform ending in separate 
administrative court system, protection of privacy versus freedom of opinion and 
assembly, limited right to asylum and, a general prohibition of habitual dwelling 
on public places.73 
This amendment ‘constitutionalized’ the government’s anti-immigration 
policy and sovereignty-fights against the EU by introducing the following.  
1) Into the text of the National Avowal (preamble of the constitution) a 
new sentence was inserted: “We hold that the protection of our identity rooted in 
our historic constitution is a fundamental obligation of the State.” In line with 
this, Article R) was also completed: “The protection of the constitutional identity 
and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the 
State.” The joint exercise of power within the EU under Article E(2) “shall 
comply with the fundamental rights and freedoms provided for in the 
Fundamental Law and shall not limit the inalienable right of Hungary to 
determine its territorial unity, population, form of government and state 
structure.” All these – partly codifying the 22/2016. Constitutional Court 
decision – give a vide margin of appreciation for constitutional court justices on 
the primacy of the EU-law. 
2) In line with the purpose of the failed and invalid referendum in 2016, 
now the constitution prohibits the settlement of ‘foreign population’ in Hungary, 
and “[a] non-Hungarian national shall not be entitled to asylum if he or she 
arrived in the territory of Hungary through any country where he or she was 
not persecuted or directly threatened with persecution” (Article XIV). Amongst 
the duties of the police the prevention of illegal immigration got a special 
emphasis (Article 46). 
3) Other governmental ‘experiences’ resulted in minor though significant 
changes in terms of human rights and rule of law. For better protection of 
common use of public places, a general ban on homelessness was introduced: 
“The State shall provide legal protection for homes. Hungary shall strive to 
ensure decent housing conditions and access to public services for everyone. The 
State and local governments shall also contribute to creating decent housing 
conditions and to protecting the use of public space for public purposes by 
striving to ensure accommodation for all persons without a dwelling. Using a 
 
72 See A. Vincze, Ist die Rechtsübernahme gefährlich? in 73 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, 1 
(2018), 193-214.  
73 See also G. Halmai, op.cit., 19-24. 
 Carved in granite? Variable constitutional  
architecture in Hungary (2010-2018) 
 
 
DPCE online, 2019/2 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
1501 
public space as a habitual dwelling shall be prohibited” (Article XXII).74 To save 
private life (mainly that of politicians and other public actors from investigative 
journalism and demonstrations) Article VI was completed: “Exercising the right 
to freedom of expression and assembly shall not impair the private and family life 
and home of others. The State shall provide legal protection for the tranquillity 
of homes.” 
To ensure the prevalence of legislative will and enforce originalism in the 
interpretation of legal acts, it was introduced that if the courts seek for the 
rationale of a legal act, they shall consider its preamble and the reasoning of the 
bill (Article 28). Finally, the amendment created constitutional basis for 
establishing a separate administrative court system with an Administrative High 
Court on the same level as the Supreme Court (Kúria), taking away the 
competence for administrative justice from independent ordinary courts (Article 
25). 
5. Conclusions 
Surveying the Hungarian constitutional amendments from the past decade 
prompts the question whether the Fundamental Law is a rigid or flexible 
constitution. There are arguments for considering it a rigid constitution because 
the Fundamental Law distinguishes and separates the legislative power and the 
constitution amending power by establishing different rules of procedure for the 
latter. It also contains detailed regulation for the exercise of state power e.g., the 
formation of the government and the motion censure, the election and the 
responsibility of the head of state. However, under certain political circumstances 
i.e. if the government acting in the parliament has a two-third majority, it 
becomes easy to circumvent these procedural and structural impediments and 
subordinate the constitution to political expediency. 
The reason for that constitution amending practise may be sought for in 
the historic and near past. Hungarians had a long-standing tradition of 
unwritten and flexible constitution that mainly restrained the quasi-external 
power of the Habsburg monarch. The first written constitution, Act XX of 1949 
was not the result of an independent and free decision of the political community 
and was not based on the democratic will of the people, it was a copycat of the 
Soviet constitution of 1936. It was just a piece of paper without any normative 
character and thus the respect for the constitution did not became part of the 
political culture. In the course of the democratic transition, a new constitution 
was not adopted and despite of the totally revised content and the steady efforts 
of the Constitutional Court, the basic law of the Hungarian Republic kept the 
label of being transitory. After the 1989 thorough revision, the former 
 
74 See to this N. Chronowski, G. Gábor Halmai, Human Dignity for Good Hungarians Only: 
The Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Criminalization of Homelessness, in VerfBlog, 
2019/6/11, available at verfassungsblog.de/human-dignity-for-good-hungarians-only. 
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Constitution was amended 25 times until the autumn of 200975 and however 
these amendments did not concern the basic structure and principles of the 
Constitution, they clearly indicate the general attitude of the policy makers – the 
constitution is not considered to be a ‘holy writ’ but can be the subject of political 
bargains. This attitude has not been changed with the adoption of the 
Fundamental Law. The seven amendments of the past years show that Hungary 
is clearly on the way of democratic backsliding76 and the Fundamental Law with 
its hampered checks and imbalances is not able to fulfil the power-restraining 
function of a constitution. Thus, Hungarians do not trust in their constitutions 
and do not really respect them. The underdeveloped constitutional culture of the 
written constitution means that the constitution itself will not help with political 
backsliding.  
 
 
75 I. Kukorelli, Magyarországot saját alkotmánya nélkül kormányozni nem lehet. A közjogász 
almanachja, Budapest, 2014, 27. 
76 A. Huq, T. Ginsburg, How to lose a constitutional democracy, in Vox, 21 February 2017, 
available at www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-constitutional-
democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian. 
